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ant's request as stated, 5 apparently misunderstood it 6 and
then disposed of the request in the misunderstood form.
The defendant's view would appear to be the more
logical one. Since proving mens rea is vital to the State's
case in homicide prosecutions, if the defendant can create
a reasonable doubt as to his state of mind it would appear
that the State has not established its case.
37
DAVID S. KLEIN
Interference With 'Contracts Terminable At Will
Clarke Langrall, Incorporated v.
Shamrock Savings & Loan Association, Inc.'
Plaintiff insurance agent contracted with one Thomp-
son to insure the latter's home. Thompson then applied to
defendant for a mortgage loan in his home. He was told
by defendant that his present insurance policy was unac-
ceptable and that he should insure through another insurer,
of which an officer of defendant company was agent. His
contract with plaintiff contained a provision for cancella-
tion at any time at the request of the insured. Thompson
exercised his option to terminate and entered into a similar
contract with defendant. Plaintiff thereupon brought this
action against defendant for wrongfully inducing Thomp-
son to break contractual relations with plaintiff. In finding
for defendant, Chief Judge Rhynhart of the People's Court
of Baltimore City held that defendant did not cause a
breach of contract, but merely induced Thompson to exer-
cise his contractual right to cancel the policy with plaintiff.
"That it (the jury) should find the defendant not guilty if, on the
whole of the evidence, it had a reasonable doubt as to whether or not he
acted in self-defense." 228 Md. 404, 408, 179 A. 2d 880 (1962).
W The court stated: "Apparently the defendant is contending that when
a defendant pleads self-defense 'the State must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant did not act in defense of himself. Such is not the
law. On the contrary, the defendant has the burden of proditeing evidence
to support this affirmative defense." Ibid. (Emphasis added).
Strahorn, Criminology and the Law of Guilt, 15 Md. L. Rev. 287 (1955).
Strahorn states, "If the prosecution fails to prove beyond all reasonable
doubt that any one of three elements of guilt of any crime, viz, the corpus
delecti, defendant's causation, and requisite mens rea, the defendant is
entitled to be acquitted. . . . Just as the absence of sufficient proof of the
prosecution's case on the mens rea element calls for an acquittal, so does
the proof of affirmative facts in defense which reach the same end as
the lack of the prosecution's case." Ibid, 320.
1 Daily Record, October 19, 1962 (Md. 1962).
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Chief Judge Rhynhart also stated that defendant was en-
titled to seek his own advantage at the expense of plain-
tiff since (1) the economic pressure exerted on Thompson
was inconsequential in that Thompson could have gone
elsewhere for a mortgage, and (2) the provision giving
defendant the right to select an insurance agent was a
reasonable business practice.
The tort of inducing breach of contract is of relatively
modern origin.2 It developed in England in 1853 from the
landmark case of Lumley v. Gye,3 where a divided court
held that an action lay against a person who maliciously
caused the breach of a valid and binding contract for per-
sonal services. Although this doctrine was initially greeted
with some caution, it was reaffirmed in 1881,1 and in 1893,
in Temperton v. Russell,5 it was extended to contracts
other than those for personal services. By 1905 the tort
achieved its present status when the House of Lords, in
South Wales Miners' Federation v. Glamorgan Coal Co.,6
held that a cause of action would lie even in the absence
of malicious intent.
In Maryland, as in most of the United States, the tort
of inducing breach of contract gained rapid acceptance. 7
It first appeared in Maryland in Lucke v. Clothing Cutters'
& Trim. Assembly No. 7507, K. of L.,6 where the court
stated that an action by an employee lay against a third
party who maliciously procured termination of an arrange-
ment between employer and employee, even though the
employee was a skilled tradesman and not a servant. Five
years later, in dictum in Gore v. Condon,9 the court stated,
"The right to maintain the action can also be sustained,
upon the doctrine that a man who induces one of two par-
ties to a contract to break it, intending thereby to injure
2Its statutory origin lies in the Statute of Labourers, 1349, 23 Edw. III,
which made actionable the enticing away of the servants of another. For
a complete review of this early history, see PROSSER, TORTS § 106, at 722-25
(2d ed. 1955) ; and Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract8, 36 Harv. L. Rev.
663 (1923).
' 2 El. & B1. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Ex. 1853).
'Bowen v. Hall, [1881] 6 Q.B.D. 333. The court strictly construed
Lumley v. Gye in holding that, if persuasion were used for the purpose of
injuring plaintiff or benefiting defendant at plaintiff's expense, such con-
duct would be deemed malicious.
5 1 Q.B. 715 (1893).
6 A.C. 239 (1905).
1 PRossE, op. cit. supra, note 2 at 724. This tort has never been recog-
nized in Louisiana. Robert Heard Hale v. Gaiennie, 102 So. 2d 324 (La.
App. Div. 1958). In Kentucky, the requirement is that only conduct which
is unlawful per 8e is actionable. Chambers v. Probst, 145 Ky. 381, 140
S.W. 572 (1911).
8 77 Md. 396, 26 A. 505 (1893).
987 Md. 368, 376, 39 A. 1042 (1898). See also Appendix to Gore v.
Gordon, 87 Md. 739, for discussion of the development of this tort.
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the other or to obtain a benefit for himself, does the other
an actionable wrong." The leading Maryland case in this
area was decided in 1908, in Knickerbocker Co. v. Gardiner
Co.,"° where the court held that one who induces another
to breach a contract by wrongful or unlawful means is
liable if injury results. The court stated that a fine balance
must be struck between encouraging lawful competition
and preserving the efficacy of contractual relations. This
approach is still cited with approval in Maryland.'
According to Section 766 of the Restatement of Torts:
"[O]ne who, without privilege to do so, induces or
otherwise purposely causes a third person not to
(a) perform a contract with another, or
(b) enter into or continue a business relation with
another is liable to the other for the harm
caused thereby."12
This section is interpreted in the Comments i3 to mean, in
(a), that the conduct induced by A constitutes a breach of
B's existing contract with C; and, in (b), that B and C are
already in a business relation terminable at will and A
induces B to terminate.
Having examined the historical development of the tort
of inducing breach of contract, it is appropriate to analyze
-°107 Md. 556, 69 A. 405 (1908). Sumwalt Co. contracted to deliver ice
at a set price to Gardiner, plaintiff. Sumwalt bought most of its ice from
Knickerbocker, defendant, an ice manufacturer. Knickerbocker, knowing
of the contract 'between Gardiner and Sumwalt, and intending to benefit
himself, notified SumWalt that if it sold to Gardiner, Knickerbocker would
cease supplying it ice. Consequently Sumwalt broke its contract with
Gardiner, and the latter was compelled to buy its ice directly from Knicker-
bocker at a higher price. The court held Knickerbocker liable to Gardiner
for the loss caused. In a subsequent case arising from the same facts,
Sumwalt Co. v. Knickerbocker, 114 Md. 403, 80 A. 48 (1911), Sumwalt sued
Knickerbocker for forcing him to breach his contract with Gardiner, and
the court again found Knickerbocker liable.
' United Rental Equip. Co. v. Potts & Callahan Con. Co., 231 Md. 552,
191 A. 2d 570 (1963) ; Baird v. C. & P. Tel. Co. of Baltimore, 208 Md. 245,
117 A. 2d 873 (1955), where a finding of intentional interference with
contract rights and not mere negligent omission to publish ordered adver-
tising was held necessary for recovery; Standard v. McCool, 198 Md. 609,
84 A. 2d 862 (1951), where knowledge of the existing contract by third
person was required for recovery; 'Knocke v. Standard Oil Co., 138 Md. 278,
113 A. 754 (1921); Cumberland Glass Mnf'g Co. v. DeWitt, 120 Md. 381,
87 A. 927 (1913), aff'd, 237 U.S. 447 (1915), where malice was determined
to be an intentional doing of a wrongful act without justification rather
than ill will in the criminal sense: Willner v. Silverman, 109 Md. 341,
71 A. 962 (1909) ; Note, Tortious Interference with Real Estate Contracts,
14 Md. L. Rev. 157 (1954), noting Horn v. Seth, 201 Md. 589, 95 A. 20
312 (1953).
"RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 766, at 49 (1939).IsId., Comment (c) at 53.
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and determine the legal effect that the interference of a
third person has on a contract terminable at will.14 At the
outset, a problem of interpretation must be discussed.
When B and C have made an agreement terminable at will,
the termination by B, induced by A, cannot constitute a
breach of contract since B is merely exercising his con-
tractual right to end the agreement. It seems, however,
that many courts ignore this distinction and continue to
call the action by A "inducing breach of contract".15
There are two different approaches to cases in this area.
A large majority of American courts have stated that the
fact that a contract is terminable at will has no effect upon
the existence of a cause of action for inducing breach of
contract. There is some authority to the contrary, however,
as a few courts have held that, since the contract is termi-
nable at will and the terminating party, therefore, cannot
be liable for breach, no action can lie against the party
inducing termination. Though these views as stated appear
to be absolute, in practice most courts look to the conduct
of the inducing party rather than the type of contract in-
volved as the real determinant.
The reasoning of the majority is that, until a contract
at will is terminated, "the contract is a subsisting relation,
of value to the plaintiff, and presumably to continue in
effect."' 6 The case most often cited in support of the gen-
eral rule is Truax v. Raich, where the Supreme Court, after
holding that a state statute limiting work opportunities to
aliens was unconstitutional as a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, stated with regard to the employment con-
tract concerned therein: "The fact that the employment
is at the will of the parties, respectively, does not make it
one at the will of others. * * * [U]njustified interference of
third persons is actionable. .".."' As in England, the tort
of inducing breach of contract was extended to reach cases
14 For a good analysis of the general area of inducing breach of contracts,
see Annot., 84 A.L.R. 43 (1933), supplemented in 26 A.L.R. 2d 1227 (1952)
PROSSER, TORTS § 106, at 720-45 (2d ed. 1955).
I See generally Comment, Inducing Breach of Contract: Herein of Con-
tracts Terminable at Will, 56 N.W.U.L. Rev. 391 (1961); Note, Interfer-
ence with Contracts at Will A Problem of Public Policy, 25 Brooklyn L.
Rev. 73 (1959).
'
6 PROSSER, op. cit. supra, note 14, at 726.
17239 U.S. 33, 38 (1915); accord, Canuel v. Oskolan, 184 F. Supp. 70,
75 (D.R.I. 1960), where a labor union, in enforcing its "closed shop"
policy, induced employer to fire employees and the court stated, "The fact
that employment is !terminable at the pleasure of employer does not render
it valueless; and the law should and does protect the employee from . . .
unprivileged interference by third persons. ... ; Mallard v. Boring. 182
Cal. App. 2d 390, 6 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1960) ; Childress v. Abeles, 240 N.C. 667,
84 S.E. 2d 176 (1954).
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other than employment contracts, for, as said by the New
York Supreme Court in Silva v. Bonafide Mills, "The ten-
dency has been to enlarge rather than restrict the land-
mark doctrine of Lumley v. Gye."'I s Following this trend,
courts have held liable persons who induced corporations
to terminate contracts,' 9 agency agreements," and, recently,
some partnership agreements.2
The minority doctrine is well stated by Professor
Corbin:
"Where by the terms of a contract a party thereto has
the power and privilege of termination, by notice or
otherwise, one who induces him to exercise that power
is not inducing a breach of contract. A competitor
may lawfully bargain with such a party to induce the
termination for the purpose of getting advantages that
would otherwise have been enjoyed by the other con-
tractor .... "22
Thus, in the case of E. R. Squibb & Sons v. Ira J. Shapiro,
where an exclusive agency contract was terminated through
the inducement of defendant, the New York Superior
Court stated in finding for defendant, "If defendant had
induced a 'breach' of contract as contradistinguished from
merely inducing a 'termination' as expressly authorized by
the contract, a different situation would be present .... -23
1882 N.Y.S. 2d 155, 156 (1948). Applying this philosophy, the court re-
jected defendant's assertion that the contract being terminable at will
could be terminated as a matter of right by the contracting party, since
defendant's methods in inducing termination were unfair and thus not
privileged.
1Tye v. Finklestein, 160 F. Supp. 666 (D. Mass. 1958); Mendelson .
Blatz Brewing Go., 9 Wis. 2d 487, 101 N.W. 2d 805 (1960). Both cases
involved attempts by stockholders or prospective stockholders to exercise
more power in corporate affairs causing firing of employees and termina-
tion of agency contracts.
2 See Freed v. Manchester Service, 165 Cal. App. 2d 186, 331 P. 2d 689,
690 (1958), where the court stated that "an action will lie for inducing
breach of contract although the means employed were in themselves lawful
unless there is sufficient justification for such conduct"; Speegle v. Board
of Fire Underwriters, 29 Cal. 2d 34, 172 P. 2d 867 (1946); Grattan v.
Societa Per Azzioni Cotonificio Cantoni, 137 N.Y.S. 2d 235 (1954).
1 See Romano v. Wilbur Ellis & Co., 82 Cal. App. 2d 670, 186 P. 2d 1012
(1947) ; Goldfarb v. Strauss, 212 N.Y.S. 2d 579 (1961).
6A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1470 &it 581-82 (1962 ed.).
- 64 N.Y.S. 2d 368, 370 (1945). This minority doctrine has been sup-
ported in some employment contracts [Cohen v. Brunswick Record Corp.,
221 N.Y.S. 2d 893 (1961), where the court stated that exercising of a legal
right by contracting party cannot be the subject of an action against a
third person for procuring a breach. The result would be different if
the gravamen were fraud] and other business relationships [e.g. Kingsbery
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 315 S.W. 2d 561 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), where
the court stated that, in a contract terminable at will, defendant had the
legal right to persuade contracting party to terminate the agreement if a
legitimate purpose was served.].
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From an examination of the cases, however, it appears that
even courts which purport to follow the minority view in-
vestigate the conduct of the party inducing termination of
the contract to determine whether it is justified.
The opinion in the case noted herein24 is illustrative of
the confusion generated by the majority and minority
views. After examining both viewpoints and all of the sur-
rounding circumstances, Chief Judge Rhynhart held that
the defendant did not induce a breach of the insurance con-
tract and that the contracting party had merely exercised
his right to terminate. He thus espoused both views in
reaching this result, thereby indicating that obsolete
distinctions still persist.
The majority and minority views both state that tortious
conduct by the person inducing the breach or termination
of contract is actionable.25 In attempting to define what
conduct is tortious, the courts have adopted such nominal
tests as "malicious interference",26 and "unlawful means".27
The adoption of these artificial tests is the result of the
desire of the courts to have a convenient category in which
they can classify what conduct does, and what conduct
does not, induce a breach of contract. A more realistic
approach would be for the courts to disregard these tests
and concentrate solely on whether or not the actions of
the inducing party are justified.
The most practical method of dealing with this tort is
simply to treat the factor of whether or not the contract
is terminable at will as just one of the circumstances to be
weighed in determining liability. The effect of such a pro-
posal would be to adopt a principle which the courts tacitly
have long recognized, 28 namely, that liability depends upon
whether or not the conduct of the inducing party is justified
under the circumstances. The focal point of this justifica-
tion - whether or not the inducing party is privileged in
his action - would be determined from the facts of each
case by examining the relationship between the parties,
21 Langrall v. Shamrock Savings & Loan Association, Inc., Daily Record,
October 19, 1962 (Md. 1962).
Supra, notes 23-24.
See W. P. Iverson v. Dunham Mfg. Co., 18 Ill. App. 2d 404, 152 N.E. 2d
615 (1958).
' This is the test used by the New York courts and was first adopted in
Coleman & Morris v. Pisciotta, 107 N.Y.S. 2d 715 (1951).
2The courts have applied this idea in the analogous area of contracts
unenforceable due to the Statute of Frauds, as in Cumberland Glass
Mnf'g Co. v. DeWitt, 120 Md. 381, 87 A. 927 (1913), aff'd, 237 U.S. 447
(1915), where the Maryland Court of Appeals stated that interference
with a contract may be beyond the scope of privilege of lawful competition
even though the contract may be unenforceable because of noncompliance
with the Statute of Frauds.
ALDRICH v. ALDRICH
the nature of the actor's conduct, the interest sought to
be advanced by the actor, the expectancy with which it
interferes, and the social interests involved in allowing this
freedom of action,2'9 as weighed against the harm that this
conduct would produce." Such a rationale would put an
end to the semantic problems of whether the inducing
party has caused a breach or a termination of contract,
since the basic issue would be the nature of the conduct,
rather than the nature of the contract13 Furthermore, it
would allow the courts to divest themselves of artificial
tests and employ the more realistic approach of deciding
particular cases according to the circumstances. The effect
of this approach would be to establish a cause of action in
tort for unprivileged interference with contractual rela-
tions.
One might ultimately be left with the question of what
effect a termination at will clause would have in a contract.
The answer is best described in a statement in a recent
New York case, Terry v. Dairyman's League Co-Operative
Ass'n,2 "The fact that the contract is terminable at will
greatly broadens the scope of the defendant's privilege.
* * * Under the principles of the free enterprise system, that
privilege is a very broad one ... ." The approach of the
New York court is indeed a sound one and should be
accorded much weight in analyzing future cases in this tort
area. RONALD P. FISH
Conflict Of Laws: Refusal To Grant Full Faith And
Credit To A Foreign Judgment For Lack
Of Jurisdiction
Aldrich v. Aldrich'
In June, 1945 a Florida court granted M. L. Aldrich an
absolute divorce from M. S. Aldrich. The decree ordered
Because of the social interests involved, the courts almost uniformly
have held that marriage contracts merit special treatment and that it is
not a tort to induce parties to break them. See PRossER, TORTS § 106 at 727
(2d ed. 1955).
'*See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 767, at 63 (1939).
"See Cosmopolitan Film Distrib. v. Feuchtwanger Corp., 226 N.Y.S. 2d
584, 591 (1962), where the court stated that the issue involved was not
the type of business relationship claimed disturbed - a contract for a
definite term, one terminable at will, or an unenforceable promise - but
rather the actions of the third person in interfering with the relationship.
"157 N.Y.S. 2d 71, 78 (1956). See also a similar statement by the court
in Mitchell v. Aldrich, 122 Vt. 19,163 A. 2d 833, 836 (1960).
1127 S.E. 2d 385 (W.Va. 1962).
On November 12, 1963, the United States Supreme Court ordered the
parties to prepare proposed certificates for certification to the Su-
preme Court of Florida on the following questions:
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